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The Possibility of Forgery 
 
John Mahlan ‘08 
 
 
In this paper, I explore some issues in the philosophy of art.  I examine a well-known 
thought experiment about a 20th century French author who, without copying the words, 
attempts to write his own version of Don Quixote that would be indistinguishable from 
Cervantes’ novel to any given reader.  I argue that this second Don Quixote is a unique work 
in its own right, and that this gives us important insights into the nature of artworks, the 
possibility of forging artworks, and aesthetic evaluation in general.  I am currently 




It goes without question that the 
problem of authenticity in art is a 
practical problem for art critics, museum 
curators, and art lovers in general.  There 
is also a philosophical problem about the 
value, if any, of forged artworks that has 
produced a fairly robust literature in the 
last half-century or so.  Particularly 
notable is Nelson Goodman’s Languages 
of Art,1 wherein Goodman offers a 
comprehensive theory of art.  The 
chapter entitled “Art and Authenticity” is 
the most relevant to my discussion here, 
and as you might imagine, the one that 
has produced the most literature with 
respect to forgery.  As a result, my 
discussion takes Goodman’s as a jumping 
off point from which to explore the 
philosophy of forgery. 
 While Goodman’s work is my 
jumping off point, my main interlocutor 
shall be Chris Janaway, whose article 
“Two Kinds of Artistic Duplication”2 
offers a defense of Goodman’s view 
                                                
1 Goodman, Nelson. Languages of Art. 1976 
(Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis). 
2 Janaway, Chris. “Two Kinds of Artistic 
Duplication”, British Journal of Aesthetics 37(1). 
January 1997. pp1-14. 
against certain arguments presented by 
Arthur Danto.  In this paper, I shall 
attempt to show that Janaway doesn’t get 
the whole truth of the matter, and misses 
some important lessons from Danto. 
 The possibility of forgery has 
produced some literature of its own.  
Peter Kivy, for instance, has suggested a 
possible case in which an allographic 
work (Bach’s Partita in A-minor for 
Unaccompanied Flute) has been forged.3  
Kivy, however, acknowledges that his case 
is a “tangential” one,4 which has led me 
to search for more substantive 
considerations.  Moreover, it is not at all 
clear that Kivy’s claim even amounts to 
an objection to Goodman at all, as Kirk 
Pillow has argued.5  My project, however, 
is separate from Kivy and Pillow’s debate.  
I am most concerned with whether or not 
two notationally identical works can be 
                                                
3 Kivy, Peter. “How to Forge a Musical Work” The 
Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism. 58(3). 
Summer 2000. pp 233-235. 
4 Kivy, 233. 
5 Pillow, Kirk. “Versions and Forgeries: A 
Response to Kivy” The Journal of Aesthetics and Art 
Criticism. 60(2). Spring 2002. pp 177-179. 
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different works, and what implications 
this might have. 
 I begin in section 1 with an 
outline of Goodman’s 
autographic/allographic distinction about 
artworks, and discuss its motivation and 
its consequences for forgeries.  In section 
2, I discuss Jorge Luis Borges’ short-story 
“Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote”6 
and the conclusions that Arthur Danto 
draws from it.7  In section 3, I discuss 
Janaway’s attempt to salvage Goodman’s 
distinction from Danto’s attack.  In 
section 4, I consider Janaway’s view, and 
in section 5, I consider a point that I 
think have been overlooked in the 
debate. 
 
Section 1 - Goodman 
 Goodman tackles the problem of 
authenticity and forgery in the chapter of 
Languages of Art titled “Art and 
Authenticity”.  There, he lays out the 
distinction between autographic and 
allographic works.  In the section titled 
“The Unfakable”, he points out the 
“rather curious fact that in music, unlike 
painting, there is no such thing as a 
forgery of a known work”8.  This is 
explained by the distinction between two 
kinds of art.  Goodman’s original 
formulation is somewhat uninformative: 
“Let us speak of a work of art as 
autographic…if and only if even the most 
exact duplication of it does not thereby 
count as genuine”9.  All other artworks 
are to be called allographic.  He offers 
                                                
6 Borges, Jorge Luis. “Pierre Menard, Author of 
Don Quixote” Cervantes. Ed. Harold Bloom. pp 63-
70. 
7 Danto, Arthur. The Transfiguration of the 
Commonplace. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge. 1981. pp 35-6. 
8 Goodman, 112. 
9 Goodman, 113. 
something a bit more substantive about 
allographic artworks in the next section, 
where he explains that the only thing that 
matters between different copies of 
musical scores or literary works is “exact 
correspondence as sequences of letters, 
spaces, and punctuation marks”10, which 
gives the curious result that, in the case of 
allographic works, an attempted forgery 
that exactly corresponds to the original 
work is merely another instance of the 
original work, and not a forgery.  By 
contrast, with an autographic work, such 
exact correspondence cannot make it the 
case that an attempted forgery just is 
another instance of the original work; it 
remains a forgery.  The reason is 
Goodman’s idea of a notational system.  
Literary works and musical scores are “in 
a definite notation”11, and this notation 
“provides the means for distinguishing 
the properties constitutive of the work 
from all contingent properties”12.  Thus, 
such works are allographic.  Autographic 
arts, like painting, lack such notational 
systems, and therefore lack a means for 
distinguishing the constitutive from the 
contingent properties of a work.13   
 It may be helpful at this point to 
consider some examples, and to discuss 
the autographic/allographic distinction 
and other common distinctions in 
aesthetics.  Imagine that we have the 
Mona Lisa in front of us.  We then find a 
painter to create a copy that is 
perceptually indistinguishable from the 
                                                
10 Goodman, 115. 
11 Goodman, 116. 
12 Ibid. 
13 Of course, there are more kinds of allographic 
art than music and literature, and more kinds of 
autographic art than painting.  My discussion is 
restricted to these very simple, obvious cases. 
Goodman himself offers fundamental accounts of 
many more kinds of art in Languages of Art. 
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Mona Lisa.  According to Goodman, this 
work is not genuine - if the painter 
attempted to deceitfully pass it off as the 
original, it would be a forgery.  The 
reason is that painting is an autographic 
art, and so perceptual indistinguishability 
cannot establish the authenticity of a 
work.  Instead, we must refer to historical 
facts about the work, such as who the 
author is, and the context in which the 
original and the copy were made.  Now 
imagine that we have Hamlet in front of 
us.  We then find a writer to create a 
copy that is identical, word-for-word, with 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet.  According to 
Goodman, this work is genuine.  It is, in 
fact, a genuine instance of Shakespeare’s 
play.  The reason is that literature is an 
allographic art, and thus operates by a 
notational system that allows us to 
identify certain works.  Since this copy 
matches up with Shakespeare’s original 
word-for-word, it has an identical 
notational system.  Therefore, it is just 
another instance of the same work, not a 
forgery.  Chris Janaway, in discussing 
Goodman’s distinction, uses the term 
“check of authenticity”, which I think is 
helpful.  In the case of an autographic 
work, the check of authenticity is and 
must be a reference to the history of 
production of the work.  The only way to 
establish that the Mona Lisa in front of us 
is the real one, painted by Leonardo, is to 
establish that Leonardo, and not some 
other painter, painted it.  In the case of 
an allographic work, however, the check 
of authenticity only requires reference to 
the notational system of that particular 
work.  The way to establish that the work 
in front of us is Hamlet is to see if it 
matches up notationally with 
Shakespeare’s.  If it does, it is Hamlet.  So 
the check of authenticity for autographic 
and allographic works is different.  Put 
another way, establishing the identity of 
artworks of each kind requires something 
different.  To identify a given painting as 
Leonardo’s Mona Lisa, we must be able to 
say that Leonardo painted it.  We must 
be able to refer to historical facts about 
the work.  To identify a given play as 
Shakespeare’s Hamlet, all we must be able 
to do is show that it corresponds 
notationally with Shakespeare’s.  The 
upshot of this is that with allographic 
works, the history of production of a 
work seems to be irrelevant to the 
identity and authenticity of a work.  This 
distinction might remind us of two 
others we often find in aesthetics, so next 
I will explain how it differs. 
 One such distinction is between 
artworks that are physical objects versus 
artworks that are performance arts.  
Painting, an autographic art form, results 
in physical objects of contemplation.  
Music, an allographic art form, results in 
performances of pieces.  But Goodman’s 
distinction cannot be made along 
physical object/performance piece lines.  
Literature is also an allographic art form, 
yet unlike music, it does not result in 
performances.  A work of literature is 
manifested in a physical object, like a 
painting.  Therefore, the 
autographic/allographic distinction 
differs from the physical 
object/performance art distinction. 
 The second distinction is between 
types and tokens of works.  Paintings are 
one-ofs, as it were, which is to say that 
there is only one Mona Lisa, housed at 
the Louvre.  Literature and music, 
however, have types and tokens.  The fact 
that I can read Hamlet here in Hamilton, 
NY at the same time as someone living in 
Tokyo suggests that there are many 
3
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tokens of that play; Hamlet itself is the 
type to which they correspond.  Similarly 
with music, there can be two genuine 
performances of Beethoven’s 9th in two 
different places on the planet.  These 
would be tokens of the type “Beethoven’s 
9th”.  But Goodman’s distinction cannot 
be made along these lines either.  The 
reason is that etchings are a kind of 
artwork that admit of types and tokens, 
and yet etchings, according to Goodman, 
are autographic works.  An etching is like 
a work of literature with respect to types 
and tokens, and yet it is autographic, 
literature allographic.   
 We might now ask what the 
consequences of Goodman’s view are.  
I’ve already said that in the case of 
allographic works, if the check of 
authenticity is simply a reference to the 
notational system of the work, then the 
historical facts of production of the work 
become irrelevant.  As a result, Goodman 
concludes, we cannot forge an allographic 
work.  As soon as we succeed in 
producing something notationally 
identical to the original, we have just 
produced another instance of the 
original, not a forgery with which we can 
deceive the unsuspecting.  In the next 
section, I consider an example that seems 
to threaten this view, presented by Jorge 
Luis Borges in a short story. 
 
Section 2 - Borges 
 In “Pierre Menard, Author of Don 
Quixote”, Borges asks us to imagine a 
turn-of-the-20th-century French author of 
some repute named Pierre Menard, who 
gets it into his head to write Don 
Quixote.14  Menard, as Borges points out, 
does not set out to simply copy Miguel de 
Cervantes’ novel and pass it off as his 
                                                
14 Borges, 65. 
own.  He does not seek to copy it 
mechanically from the original.  Neither, 
however, does he simply aim to write a 
“contemporary” version of the novel.  
Menard sets out to write the book we 
know of as Don Quixote.  Borges says of 
Menard’s methods, “To be, in some way, 
Cervantes and to arrive at Don Quixote 
seemed to him less arduous – and 
consequently less interesting – than to 
continue being Pierre Menard and to 
arrive at Don Quixote through the 
experiences of Pierre Menard”.15  As 
Borges tells the story, Menard in fact 
succeeds in writing “the ninth and thirty-
eighth chapters of part 1 of Don Quixote 
and a fragment of chapter 22”16.   
 To me, and indeed to many 
aestheticians, this story provides a 
wonderful thought-experiment.  Upon 
reading it, I think we are inclined to ask: 
what are the consequences of Menard’s 
Quixote?  I think it fair to say that 
Goodman would hold that Menard’s 
efforts were in vain.  Insofar as he 
succeeded in writing those parts of Don 
Quixote identically word-for-word with 
Cervantes’ version, he has just produced 
an incomplete instance of Cervantes’ 
version.  The reason is that literature is 
allographic, and works are identified by 
their notational systems.  Since Menard’s 
work, for those two-and-then-some 
chapters, is notationally identical to 
Cervantes’, then it just is Cervantes’ 
work.  It amounts to another copy, no 
different from the version I might be 
reading.  But this is not what Borges has 
to say about Menard’s work.  Among 
some other differences, the most notable 
is the claim that “The text of Cervantes 
and that of Menard are verbally identical, 
                                                
15 Borges, 66. 
16 Borges, 65. 
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but the second is almost infinitely 
richer…It is a revelation to compare the 
Don Quixote of Menard with that of 
Cervantes”17.  There are two things, 
specifically, that Borges offers in defense 
of this view.  First, he presents a passage 
from Cervantes, and then the identical 
passage from Menard’s.  It is worth 
quoting the section in its entirety: 
‘Truth, whose mother is 
history, who is the rival of time, 
depository of deeds, witness of 
the past, example and less to 
the present, and warning to the 
future.’ 
Written in the seventeenth century, 
written by the “ingenious layman” 
Cervantes, this enumeration is a mere 
rhetorical eulogy of history.  Menard, on 
the other hand, writes: 
‘Truth, whose mother is 
history, who is the rival of time, 
depository of deeds, witness of 
the past, example and less to 
the present, and warning to the 
future.’ 
History, mother of truth; the idea is 
astounding.  Menard, a contemporary of 
William James, does not define history 
as an investigation of reality, but as its 
origin.  Historical truth, for him, is not 
what took place; it is what we think took 
place.  The final clauses – example and 
lesson to the present, and warning to the 
future – are shamelessly pragmatic.18 
 
Borges is claiming that Menard’s work 
has a different meaning than Cervantes’, 
despite having the very same words.  The 
reason, we’re to infer, is that Menard’s is 
the work of a 20th-century Frenchman 
surrounded by a certain culture of 
mainstream thought that would be 
fundamentally different from what 
Cervantes, a 17th-century Spaniard, was 
surrounded by.  If we accept that the two 
                                                
17 Borges, 68. 
18 Borges, 69. 
works have different meanings, I think 
we must also accept that they have 
different aesthetic properties.  The 
aesthetic properties of a novel seem to 
depend upon, indeed supervene on, the 
meaning of the words in the novel.  So, 
even though the words of Menard’s work 
are the same as Cervantes’, if the 
meanings are different, then they have 
different aesthetic properties.    
 Borges points out another 
fundamental difference between the two 
Quixotes: the contrast in writing style 
between Cervantes and Menard.19  
Menard’s style he calls “archaic”; it suffers 
from “a certain affectation”, it is 
contrived, a show, an act.  Cervantes, 
writing the same words, is using the 
dialect natural to him, and so it is 
genuine, smooth, unaffected.  Here again 
we find different aesthetic properties 
being ascribed to works that are identical 
verbally, or to use Goodman’s words, 
notationally. 
 The problem that Borges’ 
conclusions present to Goodman’s thesis 
ought to be apparent.  If Menard’s 
Quixote has different aesthetic properties 
than Cervantes’, then despite their being 
notationally identical, they cannot be the 
same work, because works that are the 
same will necessarily have the same 
aesthetic properties.  And if this is right, 
then the consequences that Goodman 
draws regarding forgeries must be false, 
because if we can have notationally 
identical works that are nonetheless 
distinct works, then it seems that we can 
forge allographic works.  In support of 
that claim, I must stress again that the 
reason Menard’s version is different than 
Cervantes’ is found in non-perceptual 
historical facts about his work that are 
                                                
19 Ibid. 
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not true of Cervantes’ work.  The reason 
his work is a distinct one is that he had 
certain intentions and was writing in a 
certain cultural context that differed 
markedly from Cervantes’ intentions and 
cultural context.  Goodman’s claims 
about allographic works threaten to make 
such historical, non-perceptual facts of 
works irrelevant.  But if Borges is right, 
then Goodman must be wrong.  And if 
Goodman is wrong about notational 
identity, then his claim that allographic 
works cannot be forged falls apart, 
because it hinges on his claims about 
notational identity. 
 This is essentially Danto’s 
argument as presented by Janaway.  
Danto agrees with Borges about Menard, 
and draws two conclusions: 
1) There can be two verbally 
identical texts which 
constitute distinct works of 
art.20 
2) Nothing counts as an artwork 
at all, or as the specific work 
we treat it as, except in 
relation to the history of its 
production and the complex 
institutions of the art world 
which surround it.21 
The reasons for these conclusions are 
already implicit in what I’ve said.  The 
first conclusion is just the generalization 
of Borges’ claim that Menard’s Quixote is 
different from Cervantes’.  The second 
conclusion attempts to explain why 
Borges is right.  Menard’s Quixote counts 
as a different work because it has a 
different history of production, and 
different art world institutions 
                                                
20 Janaway paraphrases the conclusions that 
Danto endorses here. 
21 Janaway paraphrases the conclusions that 
Danto endorses here. 
surrounding it.  Janaway explains this 
point nicely.  Imagine that we found out 
“that a painting attributed to Rembrandt 
could not have been by him”.22  It seems 
to be the case that our evaluation of the 
painting would have to change.  
Similarly, imagine that we find a pencil 
sketching and learn a decade later that it 
was actually done by Picasso.  Again, we 
would change our evaluation of the 
sketching.  The reason is Danto’s: we 
would have learned that the work in 
question had a different history of 
production and surrounding institutions 
than originally thought.  Our 
identification and evaluation of works of 
art fundamentally depend on historical 
facts about the work. 
 Janaway says he is willing to go 
along with Danto on this point23, but as 
we’ve noted, this flies in the face of 
Goodman’s claims about allographic 
works.  That is, Goodman could agree 
with Danto about a painting.  We only 
identify the sketching as the work it really 
is when we know it was by Picasso.  
Goodman can accept that because 
painting is an autographic work, and he 
has already said that the check of 
authenticity with such works must 
necessarily be a reference to the history of 
production.  But Danto’s claim holds for 
all artworks including allographic ones, 
so he could say of a given novel that our 
identification of it would depend on 
similar historical facts.  Goodman cannot 
agree with this, because novels, as 
allographic arts, are only identified by 
their notational systems.  Identifying the 
given work in front of me as by 
Shakespeare only requires reference to its 
notational system and seeing whether it 
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matches up with the notational system of 
a Shakespearean work.  The history of 
production and surrounding institutions 
are irrelevant for Goodman.  Danto and 
Borges seem to have shot a hole in this.  
Janaway, as I said, is willing to grant 
Danto’s point that two notationally 
identical works can be different works.  
But he still thinks we cannot forge 
allographic works.  According to Janaway, 
Goodman has not established that point 
with his autographic/allographic 
distinction.  Janaway attempts to save 
Goodman’s conclusions about forgery by 
buttressing the autographic/allographic 
distinction with something called 
“privileged interpretational instructions”.  
In essence, Janaway’s argument suggests 
that Menard’s work can be a distinct 
work, but if he were to attempt to pass it 
off as the original Don Quixote, he could 
not trick us, and his work would become 
Cervantes’.   
 
Section 3 - Janaway 
 Janaway’s article is concerned 
with reconciling Danto and Goodman.  
As I’ve said, he thinks Danto is right with 
respect to Borges’ short story, namely, 
that it presents two distinct works that 
are nonetheless notationally identical.  
This seems to open the door to the 
possibility of forging an allographic work, 
since the distinction between the two 
Quixotes is not notational, but historical.  
This means that historical factors matter 
even for allographic works.  Janaway says 
that “It is clear that two notationally 
equivalent things must have suitably 
divergent causal histories if they are to 
stand a chance of being distinct works”.24  
                                                
24 Janaway.  Janaway offers a thought-experiment 
to defend the claim “suitably divergent causal 
But forgeries of allographic works, 
Janaway insists, are impossible.  He offers 
the idea of “privileged interpretational 
instructions” to show that this is the case, 
despite the truth that notationally 
identical works can be distinct works of 
art. 
 Imagine again that we have a 
painting that is perceptually 
indistinguishable from the Mona Lisa.  
For this to be a successful forgery, it must 
also be the case that we can be told “This 
is by Leonardo”.  This is what Janaway 
calls a privileged interpretational 
instruction.  In effect, it tells us that we 
ought to interpret the painting we are 
looking at as a painting by Leonardo.  
Our knowledge of the cultural context in 
which Leonardo was working, and of 
Leonardo himself, will then inform our 
interpretations and judgments of the 
painting.  But the work is a forgery, 
because its causal history is significantly 
divergent from the original by Leonardo.  
However, the reason the forgery is 
successful is because we can be deceived 
into thinking the painting is Leonardo’s, 
precisely by being given this privileged 
interpretational instruction.  Put another 
way, the Mona Lisa is forgeable because it 
is an autographic work.  The 
indistinguishable copy is a forgery 
precisely because it has a different history 
of production than the original.  But the 
reason the forgery is successful is because 
we can be deceived into thinking that the 
work is not a forgery, simply by being told 
that we ought to interpret this painting as 
the original by Leonardo.  When we are 
told this, our cultural and historical 
knowledge is brought to bear on the 
painting before us and we judge it as a 
                                                                 
histories”, in order to explain some intuitive ways 
of cashing that out. 
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Leonardo, even though it is not.  So the 
forgery succeeds in tricking us. 
 The same cannot be said in the 
case of allographic works, according to 
Janaway.  If we were to take Menard’s 
Quixote and tell some viewers to interpret 
it as Cervantes’ Quixote, then there seems 
to be no way in which we are truly being 
deceived.  The works, as we’ve said, are 
notationally identical, though distinct 
because of their divergent causal 
histories.  But as soon as we say of 
Menard’s work “Interpret this as by 
Cervantes”, then the causal history of 
Menard’s work drops out.  Janaway says,  
“if we held Menard’s text, the 
instruction to constrain our reading by 
the idea that it has the same history as 
Cervantes’ work would obliterate the 
significance for interpretation of the 
different history Menard’s text has…He 
cannot be tricking us”25.   
Menard’s Quixote could not be a forgery 
because as soon as we are given the 
interpretational instruction to read it as 
though it were Cervantes’ original, 
Menard’s text becomes a functional 
instance of Cervantes’; it functions as the 
original, despite being a distinct work.  
We therefore cannot successfully forge an 
allographic work, because in telling 
someone our notationally identical work 
is by someone else, it becomes an 
instance of the original we tried to forge. 
 Janaway considers the fact that his 
claim about functions could be strange.  
The objection goes as follows: just 
because Menard’s text would begin to 
function as Cervantes’ does not mean 
that it just is Cervantes’, or another 
instance of it.  It is still its own text.  But 
Janaway thinks that such claims 
distinguishing “functioning as” from “is” 
only work some of the time, and that 
                                                
25 Janaway. 
they do not work in this case.  He 
suggests that  
“To put forward a set of words that 
corresponds with all correct instances of 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote, and to 
pronounce, in the context of the existing 
(however loose) institutions of literary 
interpretation that it is that work by that 
author, functions as a presentation of a 
copy of Cervantes’ Don Quixote, and 
thereby is a presentation of a copy of 
Cervantes’ Don Quixote.  If the causal 
history of these words is outlandish a la 
Menard, and the self-effacing attribution 
to Cervantes is ironical or insincere, that 
makes no difference.  A creation which 
could have had a carefree independent 
career loses that opportunity once it 
declares in the right context that it 
wishes to be regarded as the original 
work.  By contrast, in the drawing case, 
if the forgery goes forever undetected, we 
might want to say that the forged 
drawing ‘counts as’ or ‘functions as’ the 
Picasso – but here it does so merely 
deceptively…In some settings A’s 
functioning as B is compatible with A’s 
failing to be B, while in other settings 
A’s functioning as B is A’s being B, or 
being a genuine instance of B.”26 
In short, by trying to pass off Menard’s 
Quixote as Cervantes’, we make it the case 
that it will simply function for readers as 
Cervantes’ original, and the unique 
history of production of Menard’s 
version becomes irrelevant to 
interpretation.  But with paintings, or 
autographic works more generally, while 
the forged Mona Lisa could function for 
me as the original (I could conceivably get 
the same aesthetic experience from the 
forgery as from the original), it would not 
thereby be the Mona Lisa, or a genuine 
instance of it.  Even if I’m told to 
interpret it as Leonardo’s, this does not 
make its functioning as Leonardo’s the 
same as its being Leonardo’s, which is 
                                                
26 Janaway. 
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exactly what happens in the case of 
allographic works. 
 Janaway’s argument, then, is very 
simple.  He holds that Danto’s reading of 
Borges is exactly right, and that identical 
works, whether autographic or 
allographic, can be distinct works because 
they have divergent causal histories.  This 
would seem to suggest that we can forge 
works of either kind, and therefore that 
Goodman’s conclusions about forgery are 
false.  Janaway thinks that Goodman’s 
claims were ultimately right, but 
insufficiently motivated.  To get them off 
the ground and make them work, he 
adds the notion of “privileged 
interpretational instructions”.  With such 
instruction about an allographic work, 
the divergent causal history that makes 
Menard’s Quixote a distinct work from 
Cervantes’ becomes irrelevant to my 
interpretation and experience of it.  
Thus, a forgery becomes impossible, 
because I cannot be deceived about the 
work in front of me.  So Goodman was 
right, despite Danto’s also being right. 
 It is worth mentioning before 
moving on that Janaway invokes Jerry 
Fodor on this point.  Fodor grants 
Danto’s claim about the histories of 
artworks, and calls these “actual 
histories”.  But, we can also give artworks 
virtual histories.  That is, we can tell 
stories, true or false, about their history 
of production.  Moreover, Fodor says, “it 
is in large part virtual rather than actual 
etiology that counts aesthetically”27.  This 
is another way of reading Janaway’s 
argument.  The virtual history of 
Menard’s Quixote, after we say “Interpret 
this as Cervantes’” (and thus try to create 
a forgery) takes over for the actual history, 
or makes the actual history drop out.  As 
                                                
27 Janaway. 
a result, Menard’s work just becomes 
Cervantes’, because the only thing 
separating the two is the difference in 
causal history, and the virtual history 
we’ve supplied by offering an 
interpretational instruction has made the 
actual causal history irrelevant to the 
interpretation of the work.  Menard’s 
work becomes Cervantes’ as soon as we 
tell someone to interpret it as such.  The 
virtual history matters aesthetically, not 
the actual history. 
 If Janaway is right, then 
Goodman’s conclusion has been saved.  
In the next section, I consider Janaway’s 




Section 4 – The Possibility of Forgery 
 Our aesthetic experiences are 
intimately informed by our contextual 
knowledge of the artwork we are looking 
at.  This is, of course, what Janaway’s 
argument hinges on.  If we are provided 
with a certain set of contextual 
knowledge by being given an 
interpretational instruction, we will 
experience the work before us in a certain 
way, and this rules out the possibility of 
being deceived.  To my mind, however, 
there is something more to the issue of 
causal history that we must keep in mind 
as we go through.  Before going on, 
however, I would just remind the reader 
that we have already agreed that 
Menard’s work is indeed a distinct work 
from Cervantes’ Quixote.  This will be the 
first premise of my arguments here. 
 Part of the rationale for this first 
premise is that the meaning of the words 
in Menard’s version is different than the 
meaning of the words in Cervantes’ 
version of the novel, thus making it the 
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case that the two works had different 
aesthetic properties.  It is tremendously 
important, however, to our aesthetic 
experience that the two works have 
different meanings.  If I am presented 
with Menard’s Quixote and told to 
interpret it as by Cervantes, I will have 
the experience of Cervantes’ novel.  I 
could converse knowledgably with 
students from a Spanish literature class 
about Cervantes and the novel.  In a 
certain sense, I haven’t been deceived 
about anything, because the work has 
functioned for me exactly as Cervantes’ 
own novel would have.  But I have been 
deceived about something: the work in 
front of me, since it is by Menard, has a 
different meaning than the one I’ve taken 
from it.  In a very important sense, I am 
entirely wrong about the work I’ve read.  
I’ve been duped into drawing certain 
conclusions about the work that are true 
for a different work, and false for the one 
I’ve read.  It is something like a Gettier 
problem in epistemology.  I have true 
beliefs, but not about the work in front 
of me.  My true beliefs are true in virtue 
of another work, Cervantes’ Don Quixote, 
making them true.  My “justification” in 
this case is the work in front of me, 
which is Menard’s Quixote.  But since 
Menard’s version has a different meaning 
than Cervantes’, my justification is 
defeated.  The defeater for it is that the 
text I read doesn’t mean what I think it 
means.  In epistemology, we conclude 
that though I had a justified true belief, I 
failed to have knowledge.  In aesthetics, I 
propose that we conclude that though I 
have true beliefs about a work of art, they 
are not about the work of art in front of 
me.  I have been epistemically and 
aesthetically lucky. 
It might be objected that this is a 
mere reiteration of the claim that, 
because the two works are different in 
actual causal history, they must be 
different for us aesthetically.  In short, I 
seem to be begging the question against 
Janaway.  In direct response to this, I 
would say that I have said something 
more substantive here.  I have granted 
that, in one sense, I cannot be deceived.  
The work I am reading can indeed 
function for me as Cervantes’ novel.  I 
can make, as it were, all the right 
aesthetic judgments about Cervantes’ 
Quixote.  But it is a case of epistemic luck.  
I am right about Cervantes and wrong 
about Menard, but I do not know that 
about myself.  I have therefore been 
deceived in a different way.  Another way 
to think of it is that my deception 
amounts to my being unaware of the 
diversity of artworks in the artworld.  The 
artworld is the sum total of artworks that 
exist.  Under the privileged 
interpretational instruction to read this 
text as Cervantes’ Quixote, I am robbed of 
the entirety of the artworld: I do not 
know that another work exists, also called 
Don Quixote, written by Pierre Menard.  
So while I can make the right aesthetic 
judgments about Cervantes’ novel, I am 
missing out on one important member of 
the artworld.28 
It is important to note here that 
what’s just been said, even if true, does 
not have any implications about forgery.  
The deception I have indicated is not the 
same as forgery.  As a result, what we 
                                                
28 I think that our lack of knowledge that 
Menard’s Quixote exists is extremely important 
because, if such a work really did exist, namely, 
one identical to an extant work that was not a 
copy, but produced in the way Menard wrote his 
Quixote, this would be of extreme aesthetic and 
intellectual interest. 
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should conclude from the above 
considerations is that, even if Janaway is 
right, he has missed some interesting 
points about the Borges story.  I would 
like now to present another argument 
against Janaway that may have something 
to say specifically about forgery. 
 Recall that Janaway’s argument 
involves the idea that one work can 
function as, or essentially be, another 
work.  This happens when the two works 
are notationally identical, and we are 
given a certain interpretational 
instruction about them.  The idea that 
something’s functioning as X makes it a 
case of X is basically the idea of multiple 
realizability.  In the philosophy of mind, 
this is an important notion.  There, 
something just is an instance of pain if it 
functions as an instance of pain.  The 
point works because we fundamentally 
believe that mental states like pain are 
multiply realizable, that is, that different 
beings can be in pain even if they have 
completely different physio-chemical and 
mental structures from us.  The question 
is whether we believe that artworks are 
multiply realizable in the same way. 
 In a very real sense, artworks are 
multiply realizable.  We’ve already seen 
this in section 2.  The fact that I can see 
the New York Philharmonic perform 
Beethoven’s 9th at the same time as 
someone in London can hear the 
London Symphony Orchestra perform 
Beethoven’s 9th shows that it is a work 
that is multiply realizable.  Similarly, after 
the performance, we can both sit down 
with Shakespeare or Dickens.  Again, the 
work is multiply realizable.  It seems a 
simple matter of course, then, to say that 
Don Quixote is multiply realizable as well, 
and that Menard’s work, in functioning 
as Cervantes’, just is Cervantes’ work.   
 But there is a distinction to be 
made here.  In all artworks that are 
multiply realizable, the causal history of 
each particular instance of the work is 
derivative of the original creative process.  
That is, the causal histories of my copy of 
Dickens and my friend in London’s copy 
are derivative of the original creative 
process of Dickens’ writing A Tale of Two 
Cities.  As such, these causal histories of 
each particular instance are irrelevant 
aesthetically.  That mine is published by 
Penguin Classics in a publishing house in 
New York and his is published by Signet 
Classics in a publishing house in London 
does not, and should not, matter to our 
aesthetic evaluation of Dickens’ work.  
But the same cannot be said of Menard’s 
Quixote.  The causal history of that 
particular instance of Don Quixote is not 
derivative of Cervantes’ original creative 
process.  To be sure, it refers to it insofar 
as Menard is trying to write the same 
words, but it is a new, unique creative 
process.  We have a new branch of a 
genealogical tree, as it were.  So, while I 
admit that Menard’s Quixote could 
function for a reader as Cervantes’ 
Quixote, it doesn’t thereby become just 
another instance of it.  It remains its own 
work with its own important causal 
history. 
 We should consider, I think, 
what would happen if we were presented 
with Menard’s Quixote and told the truth, 
namely that it was by Menard.  This 
would affect our aesthetic experience in a 
way that being told my copy of A Tale of 
Two Cities was printed in London, not 
New York, would not change my 
aesthetic experience of that novel.  Or, 
put another way, it doesn’t matter 
aesthetically if Cervantes decided to go to 
sleep between chapters 5 and 6 of Don 
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Quixote, or if he had writer’s block.  It 
does matter aesthetically, to the very same 
words on the page, if they were written by 
someone else. 
 This argument, however, might 
be thought to not say anything about 
forgery either.  It seems that I am still 
begging the question against Janaway, or 
that at best, I have just presented Danto’s 
argument that the two works are distinct 
works because of their distinct causal 
histories.  But the point of the argument 
is that we cannot consider Menard’s work 
one realization (of many) of Cervantes’ 
work, because its having its own, distinct, 
causal history means it is a totally unique 
thing.  It stands on its own.  It is like a 
mental state unique to one being.  If 
someone were to start printing copies of 
Menard’s Quixote, of course, it would be 
multiply realizable in the obvious sense: 
all the copies would be multiple instances 
of Menard’s Quixote.  But, while they 
could be easily mistaken for copies of 
Cervantes’ version, they would not be 
multiple realizations of Cervantes’ novel.  
The reason is that the original they are 
copies of, Menard’s Quixote, is not itself a 
multiple realization of Cervantes’ Quixote, 
but a unique work, precisely because it 
had its own, non-derivative creative 
process. 
 Still, someone might say that 
none of this entails the possibility of 
forging an allographic work.  Instead of 
trying to reply to this insistence, I would 
like to engage in a new strategy that I call 
‘tactical retreat’.  What I will do next is 
try to make explicit a point that I think 
everyone could agree that has been kept 
implicit in the debate between Janaway 
and Danto. 
 
Section 5 – The Objects of Evaluation 
 Aesthetic judgments are complex 
processes of evaluation.  But one thing 
we know about them is that we can make 
such judgments about artworks or about 
the artists that produced them.  Imagine 
a similar thing to forgery, plagiarism.  
Suppose a student turns in an A paper, 
but a week later, the professor discovers 
that it was plagiarized.  The student is 
given an F on the paper.  The F, of 
course, is not a reflection on the quality 
of the paper, but on the quality of the 
student’s work.  The paper remains an A 
paper.  We might be able to draw some 
important lessons from this about Borges’ 
short story. 
 On this view, we would say that 
both Quixotes are the same aesthetically, 
but that Cervantes and Menard must be 
evaluated in different ways.  Cervantes, 
who wrote his version in the normal way, 
produced a great work of literature.  He 
is, we want to say, a great author.  
Menard’s creation is much more unique 
because of the peculiar way in which he 
arrived at the very same words.  We want 
to say something very different about 
him, even if the end product was the 
same.  This is a strategy of tactical retreat, 
because on this view, I concede that the 
two works are aesthetically the same – 
that Janaway is right – but argue that 
more needs to be said than what Janaway 
has said.  If I’m given Menard’s Quixote 
under the interpretational instruction 
“This is by Cervantes”, I can make 
judgments about both the work and 
Cervantes.  Suppose I then find out that 
the work is Menard’s.  I still might want 
to say the same things about the text, but 
something different about the author.  
Imagine another thought-experiment, the 
classic one about infinite monkeys at 
infinite typewriters for an infinite 
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amount of time who produce Hamlet.29  
Presented with their instance of the work, 
I can make all the same aesthetic 
judgments as I would be able to make 
given a typical printing of Shakespeare’s 
play.  Following Danto, I can even say 
that the two works are different in some 
important respect.  Of Shakespeare, 
however, I would say he is a genius.  Of 
the monkeys, I would probably only say 
that they were very lucky.   
 
Conclusion 
 What, then, have I really said in 
this paper?  I take it that I have 
undertaken a Janaway-esque project.  
Janaway took a point Goodman made, 
and showed why it needed more support.  
I took a point Janaway made, and showed 
why there was much more to be said.  
While I disagree with Janaway about 
forgery, it remains the case that even if he 
is right, there are still some important 
lessons to be learned from Borges and 
Danto and the fact that the two Quixotes 
really are different artworks.   
 The question of forgery is a 
fruitful one for the philosophy of art 
because it extends into a number of 
different debates: questions about 
formalism and intentionalism, for 
instance, would certainly bear on the 
discussion of forgery, and vice versa.  
Questions about what it is for an artwork 
to be representational, and what this does 
for the value of an artwork are relevant 
here too, as well as the distinction 
between artistic value and artistic 
significance.  Aestheticians would do 
well, then, to continue to consider the 
problems raised by Goodman and Danto, 
                                                
29 Thanks to Jeremy Lupo for alerting me to the 
relevance of this thought-experiment to my paper. 
as it may help them get clear about their 
own topics of interest as well.
13
Mahlan: The Possibility of Forgery





Borges, Jorge Luis. “Pierre Menard, Author of Don Quixote”. Cervantes. Ed. Harold 
Bloom. pp 63-70. 
 
Danto, Arthur. Transfiguration of the Commonplace. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge. 1981. 
 
Goodman, Nelson. Languages of Art. Hackett Publishing Company, Indianapolis. 1976. 
 
Janaway, Chris. “Two Kinds of Artistic Duplication”. British Journal of Aesthetics 37(1). 
January 1997. pp 1-14. 
 
 
Kivy, Peter. “How to Forge a Musical Work”. The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism 
58(3). Summer 2000. pp 233-235. 
 
Pillow, Kirk. “Versions and Forgeries: A Response to Kivy”. The Journal of Aesthetics and 


























Colgate Academic Review, Vol. 3, Iss. 1 [2012], Art. 9
http://commons.colgate.edu/car/vol3/iss1/9
